Introduction
On Friday 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake occurred in the Pacific Ocean approximately 70 km from the eastern coast of Japan's main island Honshu. The resulting tsunami overwhelmed the defences protecting four of the reactors of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power station. One of these four reactors was undergoing maintenance at the time. Unable to maintain post-shutdown reactor cooling for the three operational reactors, core overheating occurred and when nuclear fuel cladding reacted with high temperature steam hydrogen was formed which accumulated and exploded. As a result of various structural problems, some exacerbated by the explosions, radioactive contamination was propelled into the atmosphere forming a plume that travelled primarily to the northwest overland before being deposited. As a precaution a large programme of immediate evacuation and extended population relocation was undertaken (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014) .
The Fukushima-Daiichi disaster was the second time that such an approach has been adopted. The first arose in 1986 following the even The events that gave rise to the hydrogen explosions (namely loss of effective core cooling and high temperature fuel-cladding steam interactions) at Fukushima-Daiichi are well-known within the nuclear industry and were not dissimilar to the problems encountered at Three Mile Island nuclear power station in Pennsylvania USA in 1979, although in that case the release of radioactive contamination was far smaller, verging on negligible (Kemeny, 1979) .
Given prior related experiences at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island one might take the view that fundamentally there is little to be learned from considering policy and strategy responses to the FukushimaDaiichi disaster. The Nuclear Risks: Environmental, Financial, and Safety (NREFS) research consortium took the view that there are indeed fresh lessons to be learned. Much of the work of NREFS has concerned quantitative assessments to examine the logical basis for population relocation policies following a severe accident. Other considerations have related to nuclear power plant siting (Grimston et al., 2014) nuclear liability regimes post Fukushima-Daiichi (Heffron et al., 2016) , off-site emergency procedures and responses to nuclear accidents (Ashley et al., 2017a) , the economic consequences of a hypothetical nuclear accident in the UK (Ashley et al., 2017b) , and policy responses and strategies to restore and adjust electricity systems following dramatic capacity reduction, as has occurred in Japan since March 2011 (Haarscher et al., 2014) . This paper presents a synthesis of a round table discussion panel which was held to elicit the lessons learnt from Fukushima-Daiichi and to identify questions that may become relevant in a future nuclear accident from the perspective of insurance and risk, an area where attitudes have also evolved since the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi. The event comprised eleven UK-based experts within the fields of nuclear insurance and risk, nuclear law, and nuclear regulation.
In the title of this paper we refer to an expert elucidation. We concede this is reminiscent of a more established phrase: expert elicitation. We hope that the distinction serves a beneficial purpose. Our approach is similar to an expert elicitation, but unlike most such exercises we had no intention to uncover new data or to refine quantitative estimates of established parameters. Rather we sought entirely qualitative insights that would add clarity to existing understanding of a complex topic, i.e. to elucidate.
Material damage and third-party liability
Our expert elucidation centred on issues surrounding insurance and risk which have evolved since the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi. Insurance and risk associated with the energy sector can be broadly divided between on-site risks and insurance (termed 'material damage') and off-site risks and insurance (termed 'third-party liability'). Three themes were identified in the area of material damage and third-party liability insurance in the nuclear energy sector and were used to guide the discussion of the expert elucidation that is further detailed in Section 3. These themes are:
'Loss' arising from a nuclear accident
Loss may be defined by various legal conventions for various jurisdictions, however, exactly defining what the losses would be following a nuclear accident, and determining and providing adequate recompense for those who have suffered loss are all far from straight-forward. The potential for such a loss affects our aversion to today's and tomorrow's risks, and our ability to disentangle the rational and emotional response to a hypothetical event as distinct from an actual event. Therefore, the main question here was to ascertain what does 'loss' mean in the context of a nuclear accident for those with a practitioner perspective?
Claims management
After a nuclear accident, two actions need to begin as soon as possible: (1) an efficient and effective emergency management response; and (2) a claims management process. This is not only of benefit for the victims, but also part of the justice system, where victims should be returned to their pre-accident position as much as it is possible. However, from an industry perspective there will be a desire to restore public trust, and the public reputation of the industry in the country where the accident occurs and also crucially at an international level. 
Liability regimes
The ability to compensate victims is certain to be a prominent issue after any nuclear accident. This is not just a nuclear specific problem, for example, at the time of writing, BP is still aiming to reduce its liability for the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. However, a nuclear accident may result in different set of issues, in particular due to the dispersion and dissemination of radioactive materials. This is an area where there were many questions. How will losses be classified for different communities affected by a nuclear accident? For those within an exclusion zone it may be more straight-forward to compensate (as they would have suffered a 'direct' loss) but what will happen to nearby communities who after a nuclear accident suffer loss of income or livelihood in areas where there was no radiological damage and no enforced evacuation (and as such could have suffered only an 'indirect' loss)? Do today's liability regimes sufficiently address and recompense those who have suffered direct and indirect losses? Do these liability regimes lead to a better or worse set of policies for the governance and regulation of future nuclear power plants?
The expert elucidation
On 17 July, 2014 the authors gathered a community of experts to London for a round-table discussion on the effect of the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi on insurance and risk. Experts were drawn from three principal communities: specialists on aspects of risk and insurance; lawyers concerned with issues of nuclear law; and safety and environmental regulators. The discussions were held on the basis that those speaking would not be identified nor would organisations and affiliations be disclosed. For that reason this paper will not disclose the precise sources of the ideas presented. While there may be benefit to be gained from a greater level of transparency it was felt that this would be outweighed by the self-imposed constraints that would inevitably arise if the discussions were to be attributed. A decision was made in favour of a less restrained sharing of ideas and concerns. The discussions covered broadly three related areas of concern:
(1) The loss arising from a severe nuclear accident; (2) The specifics of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and what it means for policy and strategy going forward; an (3) The future of liability regimes.
The discussion was such that in each case the moderator (Professor Nuttall) invited a named individual to speak before opening up the discussion to everybody for further comment. In each case, the named individual was not obliged to make any comment. Verbatim extracts from the expert elucidation are presented in Appendix A.
Loss
In the opening phase of the group discussion, the experts were asked to consider what the term "loss" meant to them, from their professional experience and practice, in the context of a severe nuclear accident. The first expert invited to speak came from the professional area of risk and insurance. The discussion revealed that a natural focus for a risk and insurance professional was not on the broad and somewhat nebulous considerations of all the impacts of an event, but rather on the bounded, specific and quantified amount of compensation due to provide formal recompense for an insured loss [Appendix A Boxes 1.1 and 1.3].
Those with a regulatory perspective were quick to acknowledge the importance of losses that would not be compensated. They opened the issue further still by introducing consideration of a "perceived loss". It was also suggested that the scale of uncompensated loss could be larger than that which would be compensated for by insurers or government [Appendix A Box 1.2].
The discussion provided evidence of a difference of perspective between insurers and those responsible for public policy. The insurers are focussed on formal contractual responsibilities, whereas regulators exhibit a much greater concern for political and social expectations going beyond what might be captured by contractual frameworks.
Noting the introduction of the idea that perceptions could be important, at this point the moderator encouraged a broadening of the issues under consideration by observing that: whatever conception we might have of loss today, is that going to be the opinion shared by the press or the Prime Minister in the weeks following a severe accident?
Two legal experts responded, the first by reminding the other participants that when considering notions of "loss" one should not just look out to the domain of third-party losses, but one should also remember the material damage losses to the plant itself [Appendix A Box 2.1].
The second legal voice suggested that the practice of classifying losses according to a "heads of damage" was a useful framework for clear thinking in a complex space of ideas. In essence, the legal experts reminded the meeting that there are several aspects to be considered and that these are managed via different processes and tribunals. Some aspects may not be as clear-cut as perhaps the insurers would like to believe, but nevertheless frameworks should, could and would be applied in practice [Appendix A Box 2.1].
A regulatory expert did not disagree but added that the important thing in a major accident scenario could be public expectations and a general desire among those affected for life to get back to normal [Appendix A Box 2.2]. Nevertheless, the insurance and risk experts reminded the discussants that, as those at the heart of the practicalities following any accident, above all what they seek and require is clarity of responsibilities and requirements [Appendix A Box 2.3].
In conclusion, we can see a clear difference of view between those whose regulatory responsibility it is to minimise the chance of an accident occurring. Simply put, their approach is more all-encompassing and philosophical, as compared with those whose task would be to compensate for insured losses following an accident. The insurance and risk specialists gravitate to more specific and quantifiable concerns and have a focus on practicalities. Arguably, the legal experts sit in between, comfortable with a broad range of considerations, but keen that any discussion be structured and clear. The authors see merit and utility in these differing approaches, but suggest that the evidence emerging from the exercise is that a sharing of perspectives can generate deeper awareness, and potentially synergise useful insights, for each individual expert community and for the set of stakeholder communities as a whole.
3.2.
The response to the Fukushima-Daiichi accident
In the second phase of the elucidation, the expert panel members were asked to consider the emergency management response following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and to comment on the claims management processes that applied in that case. The regulators were keen to comment on the appropriateness of policy in such circumstances. A regulatory expert proposed a useful division between responses in the immediate aftermath of an accident. Essentially, this involves a pre-prepared emergency plan and longer-term, more responsive longer-term measures which might involve near-permanent population relocation, as opposed to merely temporary evacuation [Appendix A Box 3.1]. In response to these ideas, a risk and insurance expert commented on the importance of the practicalities and forward planning, for example in claims handling, and pointed to the importance of advance planning and emergency exercises [Appendix A Box 3.2].
The moderator observed that one might have a set of stakeholders who may have suffered a loss, or perceive that they have suffered some kind of harm, but perhaps there is no clear or viable route available to them so that they might receive monetary compensation. More generally, he asked, is the compensation process in Japan working at a practical level?
A risk and insurance expert offered two observations in response. First, the Japanese situation was interesting in that the insurance cover did not extend to earthquake and tsunami risk and as such the Fukushima-Daiichi accident was not "an insurance event". He added that many nuclear power plants are uninsured for "grave natural disasters", as these are excluded from some liability conventions. Second, while the Fukushima-Daiichi accident was not an insurance event, individuals from the insurance sector are involved because of their knowledge, experience and practical skills, and provide practical services to the Japanese commission compensating for losses. In a grave natural disaster, one could expect that compensation funds would flow from government but be administered by skilled personnel from the insurance sector [Appendix A Box 3.3] With such comments, it is noted that insurers play a beneficial role following a severe accident even in those cases where they are not responsible for paying out on claims. One can ask: what did the world learn from the FukushimaDaiichi accident that was not already known? This expert discussion provides an insight into one aspect of new learning. The Fukushima-Daiichi accident was arguably interesting and novel because it was a major nuclear accident where the initiating event was not within the nuclear power plant itself. Policy-makers have been learning from that reality since the events of March 2011, and the discussion reported above touches upon the importance of that reality in the matter of compensation for loss. That said, the Japanese context is rather special and should not necessarily be regarded as typical of what might be expected to occur if there were to be a severe accident in, for example, Europe. A regulatory expert made an observation to this effect when he observed that he thought it unlikely that a future severe nuclear accident would turn out not to be an "insurance event". His suggestion was most severe accidents would indeed be "insurance events" [Appendix A Box 3.4].
At this point the moderator sought opinion on the international response to the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. Regulatory experts tended to the view that several international and Japanese responses could now be seen to have been an overreaction, based on an excessively precautionary approach. Arguably a similarly overly precautionary approach can be seen in the Chernobyl response [Appendix A Box 3.5].
As authors we posit that perhaps one should not solely regard any over-reaction as an excess of precaution, but one might also consider the possibility of more political considerations affecting things, such as a need for government to be seen to be doing something. Such issues are not taken to a full conclusion by our work. Of course, in respect of the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi, the UK government reaction was an international reaction and a regulatory expert was careful to point out that he saw no evidence of a British over-reaction [Appendix A Box 3.5].
Transboundary issues
The moderator then sought to move the panellists' thoughts beyond the case of Fukushima-Daiichi to consider transboundary issues and scenarios where, for example, a radioactive plume travels across national boundaries as happened after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. A risk and insurance expert confirmed that this was indeed an area of great current interest shaping, for example, thinking around the Revised Paris Convention [Appendix A Box 4.1].
A legal expert warned that we must not forget the practical challenges involved in resolving these problems. In this context, Fukushima has been challenging and a more international event would be even more challenging as there are multiple conventions in operation, and some countries are not signed up to any convention [Appendix A Box 4.2].
The moderator responded by noting that the Irish Republic is an example of a country not signed up to any international convention on third-party nuclear liability. In that situation, there may be a risk that its citizens and institutions might seek compensation through the courts and that they might pile into, for example, the British court system if there were to have been a British accident affecting Ireland. Such a scenario would be additionally troubling as the UK court system would surely have been busy enough before the nuclear accident happened.
A legal expert agreed, confirming the observation that entities in states, such as Ireland, that had not signed up to the Paris Convention might seek to bring international claims through the convention. It was noted that lawyers had started to talk of the emergence, in effect, of a "global liability regime" although such a regime is still very far from being complete [Appendix A Box 4.3].
A risk and insurance expert added that he thought it unlikely that any a future accident would ever produce "a flood" of international transboundary claims [Appendix A Box 4.4]. A legal expert responded by saying that, while he agreed in principle, one must remember that some countries are more litigious than others. He also added one must not forget the impact of nuclear infrastructure investments on the international relations within a region. There has been much European political experience of "transboundary issues" [Appendix A Box 4.5].
A risk and insurance expert added that his sector had a relatively good and improving grip on transboundary issues. The conventions are important, but are necessarily less precise than the arrangements considered by insurers for transboundary claims management. Things are moving forward arguably even towards a global regime [Appendix A Box 4.6].
A regulatory expert stressed the importance of a timely response to an accident [Appendix A Box 4.7]. A speedy response can greatly improve the victim's experience. There is a beneficial role for prompt ex-gratia payments that can reduce negative impacts and can build trust.
Risk and insurance experts responded, one expert pointed to the conventions saying they should help with speedy settlement. In addition the conventions are bringing in more heads of damage, so more types of loss could be compensated via the conventions which presumably is a good thing [Appendix A Box 4.8]. Another risk and insurance expert added that the speed of compensation is improved if the insurance specialists are allowed to be present in the emergency room managing the incident [Appendix A Box 4.8].
Regulatory experts continued to be interested in where the boundary is located between a loss or harm caused by the nuclear incident and things which should reasonably be regarded as out of scope for regulation and compensation. For example, a negative psychological impact could be triggered by the incident in some vulnerable people while "reasonable people" might be unaffected. Should impacts on the psychologically vulnerable be an issue of policy concern [Appendix A Box 4.9]? In this way it became clear that the policy issues might not be as clear cut as the insurance experts had been suggesting based on their more focussed concerns centred on compensation.
There were two boundaries in the minds of the experts in respect of the topic of "loss". One was the notion of what should be regarded as a loss and those things that should or could not be handled by policy. The other aspect concerned political geography and transboundary issues: the idea of international legal cases being presented by harmed entities in a third-party country (outside the international conventions) in the courts of a country that had been the location of a nuclear accident. The moderator was keen to hear if the experts thought that such suits would have a chance of success? A legal expert commented that it would depend on the specific circumstances but one might be able to make a successful tort claim arguing a breach in a duty of care or negligence [Appendix A Box 4.10]. In response an anecdotal intervention was made by one of the risk and insurance experts: In summary, there remain areas of policy ambiguity concerning the scope and extent of loss that should be addressed by policy, including for instance psychological harm, particularly to vulnerable individuals such as those with mental illness or simply prone to irrational thinking. While there was a level of comfort provided by the international conventions concerning transboundary issues there was some residual concern and uncertainty regarding transboundary impacts in non-convention countries and whether this could open up the risk of large scale transboundary litigation in some circumstances. Finally it was noted that anxiety issues can arise very far from any location of actual physical harm and surely policy should not fall into a trap of compensating such long-distance perceived harm.
BP Macondo incident 2010-lessons there?
Of course the nuclear industry is not the only sector with the potential to cause widespread harm and disruption. The moderator was keen to hear from the experts whether useful lessons might be learned, for example, from the 2010 BP Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico associated with the problems at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. The moderator observed that the oil company BP had limited liability 1 but nevertheless chose to make payments far beyond that limit. He introduced the topic with the words "there was a cap, which BP let be ignored. Also what I understand from the experience around Macondo is that a lot of people got compensated, even though, arguably, they didn't have a very good claim". Various legal experts commented on this point. One observed that while BP had gone far beyond what was arguably required in offering compensation its response was shaped by two factors, which may not transfer to the nuclear sector. The first was the nature of the business (end-customer facing in competitive retail markets) and the second been the amounts of cash available to the business. BP could afford to make the large payments without risking bankruptcy. Bankruptcy would help no-one in such circumstances [Appendix A Box 5.1]. A risk and insurance expert responded by saying that for a nuclear accident scenario, liability is clear cut and becoming clearer still. This expert did not see parallel ambiguities of responsibility and accountability in a nuclear scenario and concluded by noting that much of the political and media pressure surrounding an accident could be seen not as a desire for proper legal mitigation and compensation, but more as an act of Schadenfreude [Appendix A Box 5.2].
Here we see again stoicism from those most connected with matters of risk and insurance and a wider set of concerns around possible scenario developments from the legal experts.
1 As discussed further in Heffron et al. (2016) .
Trust, fear and responsibility
One of the risk and insurance experts was keen to clarify the issues raised by the proceeding discussions by observing that in the UK, direct losses, including psychological harm, were very likely to be handled efficiently and with little ambiguity requiring interpretation by the courts. Indirect losses would be held to be out of scope, for instance psychological aspects with no direct connection to the accident [Appendix A Box 6.1]. The moderator remarked: "But do you think it's sufficient for the process to consist of a letter from the insurance community that says 'Thank you for your claim but, sorry, it is denied,' and that's the only process, or do you think that the country needs to do more to manage the disappointment, the anxiety, the fear of these people who think they're affected when maybe they're not?". A regulatory voice responded by suggesting that they should, but not after the event, before the event. The moderator suggested that this might imply a role for government.
A risk and insurance expert agreed with the benefits to be obtained in acting in advance of any incident and work has been done, but getting the message across of the real risks of radiation has not been easy in the face of fear and vague associations in people's minds with nuclear war [Appendix A Box 6.2]. A legal expert agreed that much work had been done and it was good work. It was important to remember the current openness of the nuclear industry compared to how things were in the 1980s [Appendix A Box 6.3]. To which regulatory voices responded first by saying that it could be argued that precautionary approaches in accident management had led to an unwarranted increase in public anxiety about nuclear power. Another regulatory voice stressed the importance of media actions following a major accident as being important for the best outcome in all of the domains of the meeting's consideration [Appendix A Box 6.4].
The moderator remarked that today we have global media and the internet-it is not as it was in the 1960s when nuclear power first started. A regulatory expert agreed suggesting that this reality worsened the problems that might be faced by those attempting to manage the response to a severe accident [Appendix A Box 6.5]. Another regulatory voice stressed the importance of public expectations in this regard [Appendix A Box 6.5].
At this point the moderator introduced a provocative question in a UK context: "is our liability regime fit for purpose?"
Significantly, a regulatory expert responded "Well, the fact that the Paris Convention is being redone and then the Nuclear Installation Act is being redone must say that it's not fit for purpose at the moment because it's being changed. I mean, otherwise, there'd be no need to change it, so I would have thought that it's self-evident that it's not fit for purpose at the present time."
Blight
The final topic considered by the experts concerned "blight". The panellists were invited to imagine a scenario with a place where nobody's health was affected at all. Nothing bad had happened to them in any rational sense. It would appear there are a range of issues here that could prove troublesome to policy-makers. In a UK context it is important to reflect on the importance of home ownership on real and perceived individual wealth. Any erosion of property prices attributable to the accident could be politically difficult, even in a clear situation of no legal entitlement to any compensation.
Conclusions
One round-table discussion cannot be expected to solve complex policy problems, but it can help us better appreciate whether they exist and provide some greater clarity concerning key issues. As as a consequence of the research we see a clear difference between the stoicism of those closest to implementation of policies and procedures associated with nuclear risks and the greater sense of uncertainty coming from those concerned with nuclear energy regulation. Frequently the concerns of regulators relate to the boundedness of the problem. The boundary of responsibility may, or may not, be defined in law, but even when things might appear to be clear ex-ante, following a severe nuclear accident political pressures can be expected to be important. The nature of political influence and its power will depend upon the accident scenario. The expert elucidation described here was merely a first step in our research in this area. We intend to follow this work with surveys of a larger number of selected experts that allow for an improved and more detailed understanding. We also seek to bring in consideration of different national perspectives and approaches. Another possible area of additional further work could be to examine the evolution of nuclear insurance law and practice compared to the evolving experience of terrorism insurance. Similar to nuclear risks, terrorism insurance has a history of policy exclusions and of state participation.
In closing we see potential for greater academic research and scholarship concerning the consequences of severe nuclear accidents and the practical actions to be taken in such a scenario. The research presented here suggests that various expert communities concerned with such matters have differing levels of stoicism and concern. They see the issues rather differently. Through expanded communication and understanding we hope that better preparedness and resilience can be achieved in advance of any accident. We plan to explore these issues further in future research and hence to recommend improvements to policy and practice in this area.
Appendix A.
In this Appendix we present extracts from the transcript of the expert elucidation meeting. This is presented so as to allow the reader to see the evidence underpinning the narrative and conclusions presented in the main body of the paper. In the Appendix references to expert 1 and expert 2 etc. are merely provided so as to make it clear that there is a change of voice within a dialogue. The numbering does not extend beyond a given text box, so as to prevent an assemblage of one individual's views and hence preserve more strongly the anonymity promised to the participants. The Appendix is structured in numbered boxes to allow for easier linkage to the main text. We adopt the following conventions when presenting the transcripts: [word] here a word has been inferred, as it was omitted. inaudible or indistinct in the recording; [...] here some transcript text has been omitted; and <> denotes where a proper name has been removed so as to preserve anonymity. 
Part 1-comments on "loss"

